Fukushima Dai-Ichi: When Culture Trumps Engineering Judgment and the Scientific Method

Fukushima Dai-Ichi: When Culture Trumps Engineering Judgment and the Scientific Method

By Robert C. McCue, PE
MDCSystems® Consulting Engineer

In two recent articles1, MDCSystems® has examined the Fukushima Dai-Ichi nuclear plant explosion and meltdown disaster. Recently a Japanese investigative report2 has provided new insight into the cultural conditions which precipitated the disaster and contributed to the expanse and breadth of the effects of the continuing radiation contamination. While it is well-known that a tsunami generated from a powerful undersea earthquake initiated the incident, what has been difficult to understand is how a modern society with very sophisticated engineering and management skills ignored established nuclear industry standards and practices (Design Basis Events) and safety guidance (Station Blackout) norms and failed to anticipate the events that occurred leading to the nuclear plant meltdown conditions.

As discussed in MDC’s previous articles1 on the Fukishma disaster, the most obvious site engineering failure was the design elevation specified for units one through four. In addition, well-established accident scenarios such as station blackout conditions and nuclear safety related emergency power system design criteria were apparently ignored and directly contributed to immediate and long-term effects of the nuclear incident. The delayed and ineffective Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) response to the initial event exacerbated the already serious and deteriorating plant conditions and likely contributed to the ongoing deadly effects of the radiation releases.

The report3 to the Japanese parliament stated that “The Fukushima nuclear plant accident was the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO and the lack of governance by said parties.” The report goes on to state, “We believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions.” In his introduction Chairman Kurokawa said that “cultural traits had caused the disaster.” The Chairman continued his criticism by saying that “What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster ‘Made in Japan.’ Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflective obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program; our groupism and our insularity.”